Moreover, we show that the system exhibits Poincaré recurrence, meaning that almost all orbits return arbitrarily close to their initial conditions infinitely often.

In this paper, we study the problem of learning in quantum games - and other classes of semidefinite games - with scalar, payoff-based feedback.For concreteness, we focus on the widely used matrix multiplicative weights (MMW) algorithm and, instead of requiring players to have full knowledge of the game (and/or each other's chosen states), we introduce a suite of minimal-information matrix multiplicative weights (3MW) methods tailored to different information frameworks.The main difficulty to attaining convergence in this setting is that, in contrast to classical finite games, quantum games have an infinite continuum of pure states (the quantum equivalent of pure strategies), so standard importance-weighting techniques for estimating payoff vectors cannot be employed.Instead, we borrow ideas from bandit convex optimization and we design a zeroth-order gradient sampler adapted to the semidefinite geometry of the problem at hand.As a first result, we show that the 3MW method with deterministic payoff feedback retains the $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{T})$ convergence rate of the vanilla, full information MMW algorithm in quantum min-max games, even though the players only observe a single scalar.Subsequently, we relax the algorithm's information requirements even further and we provide a 3MW method that only requires players to observe a random realization of their payoff observable, and converges to equilibrium at an $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1/4})$ rate.Finally, going beyond zero-sum games, we show that a regularized variant of the proposed 3MW method guarantees local convergence with high probability to all equilibria that satisfy a certain first-order stability condition.

The Nash equilibrium has always been a central concept in non-cooperative game theory.

In this paper, we study the problem of learning in quantum games - and other classes of semidefinite games - with scalar, payoff-based feedback.For concreteness, we focus on the widely used matrix multiplicative weights (MMW) algorithm and, instead of requiring players to have full knowledge of the game (and/or each other's chosen states), we introduce a suite of minimal-information matrix multiplicative weights (3MW) methods tailored to different information frameworks.The main difficulty to attaining convergence in this setting is that, in contrast to classical finite games, quantum games have an infinite continuum of pure states (the quantum equivalent of pure strategies), so standard importance-weighting techniques for estimating payoff vectors cannot be employed.Instead, we borrow ideas from bandit convex optimization and we design a zeroth-order gradient sampler adapted to the semidefinite geometry of the problem at hand.As a first result, we show that the 3MW method with deterministic payoff feedback retains the \mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{T}) convergence rate of the vanilla, full information MMW algorithm in quantum min-max games, even though the players only observe a single scalar.Subsequently, we relax the algorithm's information requirements even further and we provide a 3MW method that only requires players to observe a random realization of their payoff observable, and converges to equilibrium at an \mathcal{O}(T {-1/4}) rate.Finally, going beyond zero-sum games, we show that a regularized variant of the proposed 3MW method guarantees local convergence with high probability to all equilibria that satisfy a certain first-order stability condition.

Quantum Tiq-Taq-Toe is a well-known benchmark and playground for both quantum computing and machine learning. Despite its popularity, no reinforcement learning (RL) methods have been applied to Quantum Tiq-Taq-Toe. Although there has been some research on Quantum Chess this game is significantly more complex in terms of computation and analysis. Therefore, we study the combination of quantum computing and reinforcement learning in Quantum Tiq-Taq-Toe, which may serve as an accessible testbed for the integration of both fields. Quantum games are challenging to represent classically due to their inherent partial observability and the potential for exponential state complexity. In Quantum Tiq-Taq-Toe, states are observed through Measurement (a 3x3 matrix of state probabilities) and Move History (a 9x9 matrix of entanglement relations), making strategy complex as each move can collapse the quantum state.

Recent developments in domains such as non-local games, quantum interactive proofs, and quantum generative adversarial networks have renewed interest in quantum game theory and, specifically, quantum zero-sum games. Central to classical game theory is the efficient algorithmic computation of Nash equilibria, which represent optimal strategies for both players. In 2008, Jain and Watrous proposed the first classical algorithm for computing equilibria in quantum zero-sum games using the Matrix Multiplicative Weight Updates (MMWU) method to achieve a convergence rate of $\mathcal{O}(d/\epsilon^2)$ iterations to $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria in the $4^d$-dimensional spectraplex. In this work, we propose a hierarchy of quantum optimization algorithms that generalize MMWU via an extra-gradient mechanism. Notably, within this proposed hierarchy, we introduce the Optimistic Matrix Multiplicative Weights Update (OMMWU) algorithm and establish its average-iterate convergence complexity as $\mathcal{O}(d/\epsilon)$ iterations to $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria. This quadratic speed-up relative to Jain and Watrous' original algorithm sets a new benchmark for computing $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria in quantum zero-sum games.

In this paper, we study the problem of learning in quantum games - and other classes of semidefinite games - with scalar, payoff-based feedback. For concreteness, we focus on the widely used matrix multiplicative weights (MMW) algorithm and, instead of requiring players to have full knowledge of the game (and/or each other's chosen states), we introduce a suite of minimal-information matrix multiplicative weights (3MW) methods tailored to different information frameworks. The main difficulty to attaining convergence in this setting is that, in contrast to classical finite games, quantum games have an infinite continuum of pure states (the quantum equivalent of pure strategies), so standard importance-weighting techniques for estimating payoff vectors cannot be employed. Instead, we borrow ideas from bandit convex optimization and we design a zeroth-order gradient sampler adapted to the semidefinite geometry of the problem at hand. As a first result, we show that the 3MW method with deterministic payoff feedback retains the $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{T})$ convergence rate of the vanilla, full information MMW algorithm in quantum min-max games, even though the players only observe a single scalar. Subsequently, we relax the algorithm's information requirements even further and we provide a 3MW method that only requires players to observe a random realization of their payoff observable, and converges to equilibrium at an $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1/4})$ rate. Finally, going beyond zero-sum games, we show that a regularized variant of the proposed 3MW method guarantees local convergence with high probability to all equilibria that satisfy a certain first-order stability condition.

In this paper, we introduce a class of learning dynamics for general quantum games, that we call "follow the quantum regularized leader" (FTQL), in reference to the classical "follow the regularized leader" (FTRL) template for learning in finite games. We show that the induced quantum state dynamics decompose into (i) a classical, commutative component which governs the dynamics of the system's eigenvalues in a way analogous to the evolution of mixed strategies under FTRL; and (ii) a non-commutative component for the system's eigenvectors which has no classical counterpart. Despite the complications that this non-classical component entails, we find that the FTQL dynamics incur no more than constant regret in all quantum games. Moreover, adjusting classical notions of stability to account for the nonlinear geometry of the state space of quantum games, we show that only pure quantum equilibria can be stable and attracting under FTQL while, as a partial converse, pure equilibria that satisfy a certain "variational stability" condition are always attracting. Finally, we show that the FTQL dynamics are Poincar\'e recurrent in quantum min-max games, extending in this way a very recent result for the quantum replicator dynamics.